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06 Intensional Models for the Theory of Types∗
Reinhard Muskens
Abstract
In this paper we define intensional models for the classical theory of
types, thus arriving at an intensional type logic ITL. Intensional models
generalize Henkin’s general models and have a natural definition. As a
class they do not validate the axiom of Extensionality. We give a cut-free
sequent calculus for type theory and show completeness of this calculus
with respect to the class of intensional models via a model existence theo-
rem. After this we turn our attention to applications. Firstly, it is argued
that, since ITL is truly intensional, it can be used to model ascriptions of
propositional attitude without predicting logical omniscience. In order to
illustrate this a small fragment of English is defined and provided with
an ITL semantics. Secondly, it is shown that ITL models contain certain
objects that can be identified with possible worlds. Essential elements of
modal logic become available within classical type theory once the axiom
of Extensionality is given up.
1 Introduction
The axiom scheme of Extensionality states that whenever two predicates or
relations are coextensive they must have the same properties:
∀XY (∀~x(X~x↔ Y ~x)→ ∀Z(ZX → ZY )) (1)
Historically Extensionality has always been problematic, the main problem be-
ing that in many areas of application, though not perhaps in the foundations
of mathematics, the statement is simply false. This was recognized by White-
head and Russell in Principia Mathematica [32], where intensional functions
such as ‘A believes that p’ or ‘it is a strange coincidence that p’ are discussed at
length. However, in the introduction to the second edition (1927) of the Prin-
cipia Whitehead and Russell (influenced by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus) already
entertain the possibility that “all functions of functions are extensional”. Thir-
teen years later, in Church’s [6] canonical formulation of the Theory of Types,
it is observed that axioms of Extensionality should be adopted “[i]n order to
obtain classical real number theory (analysis)”, a wording that does not seem
to rule out the option of not adopting them. Church’s formulation of type the-
ory was completely syntactic and axioms could be adopted or dropped at will,
∗The Journal of Symbolic Logic, to appear.
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but in Henkin’s [12] classical proof of generalized completeness the models that
are considered, both the “standard” models and the “general” ones, simply val-
idate Extensionality. Although Henkin’s text still allows giving up the axiom1
the formal set-up now effectively rules out intensional predicates and functions.
This poses problems for those areas of application of the logic where it is
important to distinguish between predicates that are coextensive and where
propositions that determine the same set of possible worlds should be kept
apart nevertheless. Linguistic semantics and Artificial Intelligence are such ap-
plications and the problem has been dubbed one of “logical omniscience” there,
for it is with propositional attitudes like knowledge and belief that predicates of
predicates and predicates of propositions most naturally arise. Is there a deep
foundational difficulty with type theory that makes the theory adequate for one
area of application (mathematics) but not for others? Or is it possible to come
up with a revised and generalized semantics for the logic, in which intensional
predicates of predicates (or intensional functions of functions) are allowed? In
the latter case Extensionality becomes a non-logical axiom that can be added
to the theory for the purposes of one area of application while in other areas of
application it is not added.
Even if one is interested in mathematical applications of type theory only
there are good reasons to consider a generalization of its models in which Ex-
tensionality fails. This was realized by Takahashi [28] and Prawitz [24] in their
(independent, but closely related) proofs of Cut-elimination. These proofs make
use of what Andrews [1] calls “V -complexes”, structures whose typed domains
consist of elements 〈A, e〉, where A is a term and e is a possible extension of A.
Clearly, two objects 〈A, e〉 and 〈B, e′〉 can be distinct even if e = e′. Andrews [1]
uses V -complexes to show that a certain resolution system R corresponds to the
first six axioms of Church [6] (not comprising Extensionality).
V -complexes in themselves cannot be used as independent models for an
intensional type theory, as their definition depends on Schu¨tte’s [26] “semi-
valuations”, essentially sets of sentences (the “V ” in “V -complex” ranges over
semi-valuations). Is it possible to define a stand-alone notion of general inten-
sional model that has V -complexes as a special case? I know of two proposals for
such general models, both recent. The first is found in Fitting [10], the second in
Benzmu¨ller et al. [3]. In Fitting’s “generalized Henkin models” abstraction may
receive a non-standard interpretation, while in the “Σ-models” of Benzmu¨ller
et al. it is application that may be interpreted in a non-standard way. Such
non-standard evaluations seem unnecessary, however, and in this paper, I will
propose a simple definition of intensional model that generalizes Henkin mod-
els for type theory but gives all logical operations their usual semantics. The
system of type theory interpreted with the help of these intensional models will
be called ITL (‘Intensional Type Logic’).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we
will consider some existing proposals to obtain intensionality and we will argue
1Henkin [12]: The axioms of extensionality . . . can be dropped if we are willing to admit
models whose domains contain functions which are regarded as distinct even though they have
the same value for every argument.
2
that they all have a simple pattern in common that can be used to obtain a
general intensional logic. Section 3 gives the types and terms of a type theory
in the spirit of Church [6] (but framed as a relational theory, as in Orey [22] and
Schu¨tte [26]). In section 4 our notion of intensional model will be defined, with
a corresponding notion of entailment. Section 5 introduces a cut-free Gentzen
calculus for ITL while section 6 proves a Model Existence theorem. The proofs
in that section all employ familiar techniques but are given as a sanity check on
the definition of the basic modeltheoretic notions. The last two sections consider
applications: Section 7 uses the logic to provide a fragment of natural language
with a truly intensional semantics while section 8 shows how possible worlds can
be obtained as certain objects in intensional models. A short conclusion ends
the paper.
2 Informal Analysis
Given Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indistinguishables and the assumption
that ∀ and → behave classically, ∀Z(ZX → ZY ) implies X = Y and
∀XY (∀~x(X~x↔ Y ~x)→ X = Y ) (2)
therefore will be equivalent with Extensionality. This means that a semantics
in which this axiom fails cannot under reasonable assumptions identify the se-
mantic value of an expression with its extension, as ∀~x(X~x ↔ Y ~x) just states
that X and Y are co-extensive. The following is a propositional instantiation
of (2) (with the length of ~x set to 0 and X and Y instantiated as ϕ and ψ
respectively).
(ϕ↔ ψ)→ ϕ = ψ (3)
Here ϕ↔ ψ expresses that ϕ and ψ have the same truth value whereas ϕ = ψ
says they are the same proposition. Typically we want this scheme to fail, as
sentences with the same truth values may be distinguishable in the sense that
one is believed while the other is not, or that one is a strange coincidence, while
the other is entirely expected, etc. Many propositions must therefore be allowed
to exist, although each proposition must assume one of two truth values if we
want to retain classicality.
Although the semantic values of sentences cannot be equated with their
truth values, it still seems reasonable to require that they should determine
these truth values, while the values of expressions of higher type should likewise
determine their extensions. If this is accepted the picture that arises is that
logical expressions are sent to their (intensional) values by some function I,
while these values in their turn are connected with extensions by a function E.
The latter typically does not need to be injective. Readers familiar with the ex-
tensive literature on intensionality (sometimes dubbed hyper intensionality) will
be aware that, while there are many divergent proposals for what intensions
are, the pattern just sketched is well-nigh ubiquitous. Already in Frege’s [11]
pivotal work an expression expresses a sense (the function I) while a sense in its
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turn determines a reference (E). In modal logic, intensions are functions from
possible worlds to extensions (let us call such functions modal intensions) and
the function E can be viewed as application of such functions to a fixed ‘actual’
world w0. It is obvious that this modal strategy does not individuate intensions
finely enough (essentially since, if W1 and W2 denote sets of possible worlds or
the characteristic functions of such sets, ∀w(W1w ↔ W2w) → W1 = W2 will
hold) and many researchers have sought notions of intension coming with more
fine-grained criteria of individuation than modal intensions come with. Car-
nap [4], for example, who defined a precursor to the now usual possible worlds
analysis of natural language, noticed the problems that this analysis suffers
from and proposed a theory of structured meanings that was later worked out
in Lewis [14] and Cresswell [8]. On Lewis’ account the meaning of an expression
is a finite ordered tree having at each node a category and an appropriate modal
intension. The modal intension at the root node of this tree is the one associated
with the expression as a whole and so in this theory the function I assigns finite
ordered trees of categories and modal intensions to any given expression, while
E is the function that takes any such tree and returns Ww0, where W is the
modal intension found at its root node.
Another example of an approach in which the functions I and E can eas-
ily be recognised is the theory of impossible worlds. The idea behind this line
of thought is that if the usual set of possible worlds is not large enough to
make enough distinctions between semantic values, extra worlds, impossible
ones, should be added. A key point is that the logical operators need not have
their usual meaning at these points of reference and that logical validities will
therefore cease to hold throughout the set of all worlds. The name “impossible
(possible) world” derives from Hintikka [13], but the idea was also present in
Montague [15] and Cresswell [7] and has been followed up in Rantala [25], Bar-
wise [2], and Zalta [34], for example. The function I here is the function that
sends each sentence to a set of possible and impossible worlds, wheras E can be
described as λW.Ww0, as in the ordinary modal account.
Other approaches to intensionality may have different conceptions of the na-
ture of intensions, but will also follow a two-stage pattern in which expressions
are first sent to their intensions (whatever these are) and intensions are subse-
quently related to extensions. For example, in Property Theory (Turner [31],
Chierchia and Turner [5]) one finds a homomorphism T sending an algebra of
‘information units’ I to a boolean algebra P (Chierchia and Turner [5]). Here
the information units act as intensions while the elements of P are the exten-
sions and T is the function we have called E. Thomason [30] uses a higher-order
logic that obeys a form of Extensionality to interpret natural language sentences
in a domain Dp of propositions considered as primitive entities and then uses
a function ∪ (our E) to send these propositions to their extensions (see also
Muskens [20]). Moschovakis [17], to give a last example, identifies senses with
algorithms and references with the values that these algorithms return. Here
the function that sends expressions to algorithms is our I while E assigns to
each algorithm the value returned.
Thus while opinions about the nature of intensions radically diverge, all pro-
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posals follow a simple two-stage pattern. The aim of this paper is not to add
one more theory of intension to the proposals that have already been made,
but is an investigation of their common underlying logic. The idea will be that
the two-stage set-up is essentially all that is needed to obtain intensionality.
For the purposes of logic it suffices to consider intensions as abstract objects;
the question what intensions are, while philosophically important, can be ab-
stracted from. Conversely, while many positions regarding the ultimate nature
of intensions seem rationally possible and no knock-down arguments are likely
to decide the matter, it does equally seem possible to rationally converge on
a logic describing what intensions do. Here we attempt to contribute to that
logic.
3 Terms
In this section the types and terms of ITL will be defined and some notation will
be adopted. While this ITL syntax will be given an intensional interpretation
in the next section, it essentially is the syntax of the simple type theory of
Church’s [6]. The intended interpretation will be relational, however, as in
Orey [22] and Schu¨tte [26], not functional, as in Church’s original work.
Assuming that some finite set B of basic types is given, the following defini-
tion gives the set of types.
Definition 1. The set T of types is the smallest set of strings such that
1. B ⊆ T
2. If α1, . . . , αn ∈ T (n ≥ 0) then 〈α1 . . . αn〉 ∈ T
Types formed with the second clause of this definition will be called complex.
The intended interpretation is that the extension of an object of type 〈α1 . . . αn〉
is an n-place relation taking objects of type αi as its i-th argument. Note that,
as a limiting case, 〈〉 is defined to be a (complex) type; this will be the type of
propositions, with truth values as extensions.
A language will be a countable set of uniquely typed non-logical constants.
If L is a language, the set of constants from L that have type α is denoted Lα.
For each α ∈ T we moreover assume the existence of a denumerably infinite set
Vα of variables with unique type α. We let V =
⋃
α∈T Vα.
The following definition gives us terms in all types. Apart from variables
and non-logical vocabulary there will be a sentence ⊥ that is always false, and
there will be application and abstraction. Furthermore, a symbol ⊂ will denote
inclusion of extensions, so that A ⊂ B is true if the extension of A is a subset
of that of B.
Definition 2. Let L be a language. Define sets TLα of terms of L of type α,
for each α ∈ T , as follows.
1. Lα ⊆ T
L
α and Vα ⊆ T
L
α for each α ∈ T
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2. ⊥ ∈ TL〈〉
3. If A ∈ TL〈α1α2...αn〉 and B ∈ T
L
α1
, then (AB) ∈ TL〈α2...αn〉
4. If A ∈ TL〈α2...αn〉 and x ∈ Vα1 , then (λx.A) ∈ T
L
〈α1α2...αn〉
5. If A ∈ TLα and B ∈ T
L
α then (A ⊂ B) ∈ T
L
〈〉, if α is complex
We will write TL for the set of all terms of the language L, i.e. for the union⋃
α∈T T
L
α . If A is a term of type α, we may indicate this by writing Aα and we
will use ϕ, ψ, χ for terms of type 〈〉, which we call formulas. The notions free and
bound occurrence of a variable and the notion B is free for x in A are defined
as usual, as are closed terms and sentences. Substitutions are functions σ from
variables to terms such that σ(x) has the same type as x. If σ is a substitution
then the substitution σ′ such that σ′(x) = A and σ′(y) = σ(y) for all y 6≡ x is
denoted as σ[x := A]. If A is a term and σ is a substitution, Aσ, the extension
of σ to A, is defined in the usual way. The substitution σ such that σ(xi) = Ai
and σ(y) = y if y /∈ {x1, . . . , xn} is written as {x1 := A1, . . . , xn := An}.
Parentheses in terms will often be dropped on the understanding that ABC is
((AB)C), i.e. association is to the left.
Our stock of operators may seem somewhat spartan, but is rich enough to
let the usual connectives and quantifiers be defined. In particular, ∀, → and =
are easily obtained.
Definition 3. Write
ϕ→ ψ for ϕ ⊂ ψ,
⊤ for ⊥ → ⊥,
∀xϕ for (λx.⊤) ⊂ (λx.ϕ), and
Aα = Bα for ∀x〈α〉 (xA→ xB).
The operators ¬, ∧, ∨, ↔ and ∃ are defined as usual.
Our presentation of the logic will revolve around sequents. A signed sentence
of L will be a pair 〈L, ϕ〉 (written L : ϕ) or a pair 〈R, ϕ〉 (written R : ϕ), such that
ϕ is a sentence of L (L indicates ‘left’ and R indicates ‘right’). A sequent of L
is a set of signed sentences of L. Letting sequents be sets has some advantages,
but we may also want to use a more conventional form and write Π ⇒ Σ for
{L : ϕ | ϕ ∈ Π} ∪ {R : ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ} if Π and Σ are sets of sentences.
4 Intensional Models
Let us turn to the semantics of ITL, which will essentially follow the two-stage
pattern discussed above. The following definition sets up the usual hierarchies
of objects and provides some of the usual notation.
Definition 4. A collection of domains will be a set {Dα | α ∈ T } of pairwise
disjoint non-empty sets. An assignment a for a collection of domains D =
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{Dα | α ∈ T } is a function which has the set of variables V as domain and
has the property that a(x) ∈ Dα if x ∈ Vα. The set of all assignments for D
is denoted AD. If a is an assignment, d ∈ Dα, and x is a variable of type α,
a[d/x] is defined by letting a[d/x](x) = d and a[d/x](y) = a(y), if y is not equal
to x.
Note that we have not imposed any non-trivial relations between the elements of
any given collection of domains D. In particular we have not required domains
D〈α1...αn〉 to consist of relations over lower domains. This is because we need
to tease apart the intensions and extensions of terms of complex type. While
extensions of such terms will be certain relations, with their identity criteria
therefore given by set membership, the intension functions defined below send
terms to almost arbitrary domain elements.
Definition 5. An intension function for a collection of domains D = {Dα |
α ∈ T } and a language L is a function I : AD × T
L → D such that
1. I(a,A) ∈ Dα, if A is of type α
2. I(a, x) = a(x), if x is a variable
3. I(a,A) = I(a′, A), if a and a′ agree on all variables free in A
4. I(a,A{x := B}) = I(a[I(a,B)/x], A), if B is free for x in A
Intension functions are the formal counterpart of the functions I that were
discussed informally above. They take an extra assignment argument in order
to take care of free variables.
The second part of our formalisation of the two-stage architecture discussed
above are the extension functions of definition 6. They send objects of complex
types to certain relations over the relevant domains. We first give very general
constraints and will put more requirements on useful extension functions in
definition 8.
Definition 6. An extension function for a collection of domains D = {Dα |
α ∈ T } is a function E with domain ∪{Dα | α is complex} such that E(d) ⊆
Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn whenever d ∈ D〈α1...αn〉.
The restriction of E to Dα is written as Eα, for any complex type α, so that
Eα : Dα → P(Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn) if α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉.
The limiting case that n = 0 is of some interest here. In this case the product
Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn equals {〈〉}. We identify 〈〉 with ∅, ∅ with 0, and {∅} with 1,
so that E〈〉 : D〈〉 → {0, 1} if E〈〉 is an extension function of type 〈〉 for D. Note
that, while the range of E〈〉 thus consists of the two standard truth-values, the
domain D〈〉 of propositions can have any cardinality ≥ 2. Propositions with
the same truth-value need not be identified and, as will become apparent, even
propositions that receive the same truth value in all structures need not be
identical in any given structure.
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Definition 7. A generalized frame for the language L is a triple 〈D, I,E〉 such
that D is a collection of domains, I is an intension function for D and L, and
E is an extension function for D.
We are interested in the extensions E(I(a,Aα)) of terms A of complex type α.
Let V be the composition of E and I, so that, in the interest of readability,
we can write V (a,A), for E(I(a,A)). The following definition, which gives
the central notion of this paper, puts constraints on intension and extension
functions that cause terms to get their usual semantic values.
Definition 8. A generalized frame 〈D, I,E〉 for L is an intensional model for
L if
1. V (a,⊥) = 0
2. V (a,AB) = {〈~d〉 | 〈I(a,B), ~d〉 ∈ V (a,A)}
3. V (a, λxβ .A) = {〈d, ~d〉 | d ∈ Dβ and 〈~d〉 ∈ V (a[d/x], A)}
4. V (a,A ⊂ B) = 1⇐⇒ V (a,A) ⊆ V (a,B)
To better understand the motivation behind the second and third clauses of
this definition, it may help to consider that any n + 1 place relation R can be
thought of as a unary function F such that F (d) = {〈~d〉 | 〈d, ~d〉 ∈ R}. Thus
V (a,AB) = F (I(a,B)), where F is the function corresponding to V (a,A) and
V (a, λxβ .A) corresponds to the function F such that F (d) = V (a[d/x], A) for
each d ∈ Dβ . For further discussion of this little trick in an extensional setting
see Muskens [18, 19].
If M = 〈D, I,E〉 is an intensional model, a is an assignment for D, and ϕ is
a formula, we may alternatively write M |= ϕ[a] for V (a, ϕ) = 1. In case ϕ is a
sentence it makes sense to write M |= ϕ if M |= ϕ[a] for some a. The following
facts are unsurprising but useful.
Proposition 1. Let M = 〈D, I,E〉 be an intensional model, and let a be an
assignment for D. Then, for all ϕ, ψ, A, B and B′ of appropriate types,
1. V (a, ϕ→ ψ) = 0 iff V (a, ϕ) = 1 and V (a, ψ) = 0;
2. V (a, ∀xαϕ) = 1 iff V (a[d/x], ϕ) = 1 for all d ∈ Dα;
3. V (a, (λx.A)B) = V (a,A{x := B}), if B is free for x in A;
4. If V (a,A = B) = 1 then V (a,A ⊂ B) = 1;
5. V (a,A = A) = 1;
6. If V (a,B = B′) = 1 then V (a,A{x := B} = A{x := B′}) = 1, provided
B and B′ are free for x in A.
Proof. Left to the reader.
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Note that β-conversion preserves extensional identity, but that it does not nec-
essarily preserve intensional identity, i.e. (λxα.A)B = A{x := B} is not neces-
sarily true given the usual side condition. Similar remarks can be made about
η-conversion and even about α-conversion. Since it is not necessary to hard-
wire these principles into the logic, we have chosen not to do so. However, the
principles can clearly be added to the logic by means of an axiomatic extension.
In section 7 below, where a linguistic application is considered, this axiomatic
extension will be given.
The last two statements in proposition 1 above show that = is the usual
congruence, but intensional models may still have the undesirable property that
= does not denote true identity of intension. This is an anomaly we want to get
rid of. Intensional models are called normal just in case they have the desired
property.
Definition 9. An intensional model M = 〈D, I,E〉 is normal if, for any type
α, any d, d′ ∈ Dα, and any a, 〈d, d
′〉 ∈ V (a, λxαλx
′
α.x = x
′) implies d = d′.
That a restriction to normal intensional models does not buy us any new truths
is shown by the next proposition. Its proof uses the Axiom of Choice unless M
is countable.
Proposition 2. Let M be an intensional model. There is a normal intensional
model M such that M |= ϕ⇐⇒M |= ϕ for each sentence ϕ.
Proof. SupposeM = 〈D, I,E〉. Let ∼ be the relation given by d ∼ d′ iff 〈d, d′〉 ∈
V (a, λxαλx
′
α.x = x
′) for any d, d′ ∈ Dα and any α (where a is arbitrary).
Clearly, ∼ is an equivalence relation. Note that, by proposition 1 and definition
5, for any term A,
d ∼ d′ =⇒ I(a[d/x], A) ∼ I(a[d′/x], A) . (4)
Define d = {d′ | d ∼ d′}, let Dα = {d | d ∈ Dα}, and let D = {Dα | α ∈ T }.
Let f be a function such that f(d) ∈ d, if d ∈ Dα. For any assignment a for
D, let a◦ be the assignment for D defined by a◦(x) = f(a(x)), for all x. Let
I(a,A) = I(a◦, A), for each assignment a for D and each term A. Then I is an
intension function for D. The first three requirements of definition 5 are easily
checked, so let us check the last requirement. Note that
I(a◦, A{x := B}) = (Definition 5)
I(a◦[I(a◦, B)/x], A) ∼ (4)
I(a◦[f(I(a◦, B))/x]), A) = (definition of I)
I(a◦[f(I(a,B))/x]), A) = (definition of ◦)
I((a[I(a,B)/x])◦, A) .
From this conclude that I(a,A{x := B}) = I(a[I(a,B)/x], A).
Define E by letting E(dα) = {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 | 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ E(d)}, if α is com-
plex. It is easy to see that this is well-defined. Since 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ E(I(a,A))
iff 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ V (a
◦, A) it follows thatM = 〈D, I,E〉 is an intensional model,
M |= ϕ⇐⇒M |= ϕ for each sentence ϕ, and M is normal.
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Π⇒ Σ
[W ]
Π′ ⇒ Σ′
, if Π ⊆ Π′, Σ ⊆ Σ′
[R]
Π, ϕ⇒ Σ, ϕ
[⊥L]
Π,⊥ ⇒ Σ
Π, A{x := B} ~C ⇒ Σ
[λL]
Π, (λx.A)B ~C ⇒ Σ
Π⇒ Σ, A{x := B} ~C
[λR]
Π⇒ Σ, (λx.A)B ~C
if B is free for x in A if B is free for x in A
Π, B ~C ⇒ Σ Π⇒ Σ, A~C
[⊂ L]
Π, A ⊂ B ⇒ Σ
Π, A~c⇒ Σ, B~c
[⊂R]
Π⇒ Σ, A ⊂ B
if the constants ~c are fresh
Table 1: Gentzen rules for ITL.
Now that the situation with respect to normality and non-normality of inten-
sional models has become clear, we can define our semantic notion of conse-
quence.
Definition 10. An intensional model M for L refutes a sequent Π ⇒ Σ of L
if M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Π and M 6|= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Σ. A sequent Γ is i-valid if no
intensional model for L refutes Γ. Π i-entails Σ, Π |=i Σ, if Π⇒ Σ is i-valid.
Let us take stock. We have defined a notion of intensional model following the
two-stage pattern discussed in section 2. This is also the pattern followed in Fit-
ting [10], but we have avoided the complex “abstraction designation functions”
that are used there but do not seem to have a justification beyond the fact that
they are needed in proofs. Intensional models are a further generalisation of
Henkin models in the following sense. While in intensional models the functions
E〈α1...αn〉 : D〈α1...αn〉 → P(Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn)
need neither be injective nor surjective, the usual Henkin models are essentially
obtained if an injectivity requirement is imposed. An additional requirement
of surjectivity brings us to a variant of the so-called standard models of type
theory.
5 Proof Theory
We now provide the relation of i-entailment with what will turn out to be
a syntactic equivalent. The rules in Table 1, for which the usual notational
conventions apply, constitute a Gentzen sequent calculus for ITL. If Π ⇒ Σ is
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[⊤R]
Π⇒ Σ,⊤
Π, ψ ⇒ Σ Π⇒ Σ, ϕ
[→ L]
Π, ϕ→ ψ ⇒ Σ
Π, ϕ⇒ Σ, ψ
[→R]
Π⇒ Σ, ϕ→ ψ
Π, ϕ{x := A} ⇒ Σ
[∀L]
Π, ∀xϕ⇒ Σ
Π⇒ Σ, ϕ{x := c}
[∀R]
Π⇒ Σ, ∀xϕ
where c is fresh
Π, A
.
= B ⇒ Σ, ϕ{x := A}
[=L]
Π, A
.
= B ⇒ Σ, ϕ{x := B}
[=R]
Π⇒ Σ, A = A
where A
.
= B is A = B or B = A
Table 2: Some classical rules derivable in ITL.
a (finite or infinite) sequent, then we say that Π ⇒ Σ is provable, Π ⊢ Σ, if
there are finite Π0 ⊆ Π and Σ0 ⊆ Σ such that Π0 ⇒ Σ0 can be proved in this
calculus. The following theorem states that the calculus is sound.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). If a sequent Γ is provable, Γ is i-valid. Hence
Π ⊢ Σ =⇒ Π |=i Σ
Proof. Left to the reader. (The proof involves some observations about the
behaviour of intension functions when the language is extended.)
That the converse (generalized completeness) also holds will be shown in the
next section.
While the rules in Table 1 suffice to characterize the |=i relation, it is pleasant
to also have the usual classical Gentzen rules for the defined connectives at one’s
disposal. These are available as derived rules. By way of example those for ⊤,
→, ∀, and = are given in Table 2. Given the abbreviations in definition 3, they
are easily derivable from the ITL rules, as the reader may verify. Note that
in view of the correctness of these rules it seems reasonable to say that ITL is
indeed a classical logic.
6 Model Existence
The purpose of this section—which could be skipped on a first reading by readers
mainly interested in the general characteristics of our logic—is to prove Gener-
alized Completeness and some of its friends, such as the generalized Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem and Compactness theorems. We will do this in the way Smullyan [27]
did it for first-order logic, via a central Model Existence theorem from which
the desired theorems all follow as corollaries. First it will be proved that certain
11
“Hintikka” sequents, which can be thought of as resulting from a systematic
but unsuccessful attempt to construct a Gentzen proof from the bottom up, are
refutable. This is then used to show refutability of a wide class of sequents.
The definition of Hintikka sequents is close to that of the “Hintikka sets” in
Smullyan [27] and Fitting [9, 10], but is also analogous to that of Schu¨tte’s [26]
semi-valuations.
Definition 11. A sequent Γ of L is called a Hintikka sequent in L if the
following hold:
1. {L : ϕ, R : ϕ} 6⊆ Γ for any sentence ϕ;
2. L : ⊥ /∈ Γ;
3. L : (λx.A)B ~C ∈ Γ =⇒ L : A{x := B} ~C ∈ Γ, if λx.A, B, and the sequence
of terms ~C are closed and of appropriate type;
4. R : (λx.A)B ~C ∈ Γ =⇒ R : A{x := B} ~C ∈ Γ, if λx.A, B, and the sequence
of terms ~C are closed and of appropriate type;
5. L : A ⊂ B ∈ Γ =⇒ L : B ~C ∈ Γ or R : A~C ∈ Γ, for all closed A, B and
sequences of closed ~C of appropriate types;
6. R : A ⊂ B ∈ Γ =⇒ there are constants ~c of appropriate types such that
{L : A~c,R : B~c} ⊆ Γ.
A Hintikka sequent Γ in L is said to be complete if L : ϕ ∈ Γ or R : ϕ ∈ Γ, for
each sentence ϕ of L.
A key property of Hintikka sequents is that they are refuted by intensional
models, as the following lemma shows. The intensional model constructed in its
proof is closely akin to Andrews’ V -complexes.
Lemma 4 (Hintikka Lemma). Let Γ be a Hintikka sequent in a language L
such that Lα 6= ∅ if α is basic. Then Γ is refuted by an intensional model. If Γ
is complete, then Γ is refuted by a normal countable intensional model.
Proof. Let Γ be a Hintikka sequent in the language L as described. We will
find an intensional model refuting Γ using the Takahashi-Prawitz construction.
The following induction on type complexity defines domains Dα as sets of pairs
〈A, e〉, where A is a closed term of type α and e is called a possible extension of
A.
1. If α is basic let Dα = {〈c, c〉 | c ∈ Lα};
2. If α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉 let 〈Aα, e〉 ∈ Dα iff A is closed, e ⊆ Dα1 × · · · × Dαn
and, whenever 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , 〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn
(a) If L : AB1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ e;
(b) If R : AB1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 /∈ e.
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It is worth observing that each Dα is a function if Γ is complete. In that case
each Dα will be countable.
The set D = {Dα | α ∈ T } will be the collection of domains of the refuting
intensional model we are after. Note that, since each term has a unique type,
the Dα are pairwise disjoint. The Dα are also non-empty. This follows from the
assumption that Lα 6= ∅ in case α is basic; in case α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉 it is easy to
show that 〈λxα1 . . . λxαn .⊥,∅〉 ∈ Dα.
We will define a function I which will turn out to be an intension function
for D. First some handy notation. If π is an ordered pair, write π1 and π2 for
the first and second elements of π respectively, so that π = 〈π1, π2〉. If f is a
function whose values are ordered pairs, write f1 and f2 for the functions with
the same domain as f , such that f1(z) = (f(z))1 and f2(z) = (f(z))2 for any
argument z. Let a be an assignment for D. The substitution ←−a is defined by
←−a (x) = a1(x) and we let I1(a,A) = A←−a for any term A. The second component
of I, is defined by letting I2 =
⋃
α∈T I
2
α, where the I
2
α are functions such that
I2α : AD × T
L
α → T
L
α if α ∈ B and
I2α : AD × T
L
α → P(Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn) ,
if α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉. The I
2
α in their turn are defined using the following induction
on the complexity of terms.
1. I2α(a, xα) = a
2(x), if x is a variable;
I2α(a, cα) = c, if α is basic;
I2α(a, cα) = {〈〈A1, e1〉, . . . , 〈An, en〉〉 | 〈Ai, ei〉 ∈ Dαi & L : cA1 . . . An ∈ Γ},
if α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉;
2. I2〈〉(a,⊥) = 0
3. I2〈~α〉(a,A〈β~α〉Bβ) = {〈
~d〉 | 〈〈I1(a,B), I2β(a,B)〉,
~d〉 ∈ I2〈β~α〉(a,A)}
4. I2〈β~α〉(a, λxβA〈~α〉) = {〈d,
~d〉 | d ∈ Dβ & 〈~d〉 ∈ I
2
〈~α〉(a[d/x], A)}
5. I2〈〉(a,A ⊂ B) = 1⇐⇒ I
2
α(a,Aα) ⊆ I
2
α(a,Bα)
Note that this definition does not depend on the question whether I is an in-
tension function for D and L, and indeed the latter is not immediately obvious.
We need to check the requirements in definition 5. That I(a, x) = a(x) for any
variable x is immediate and that I(a,A) = I(a′, A) if a and a′ agree on the
variables free in A follows by a standard property of substitutions and an easy
induction. Suppose that B is free for x in A. Then
I1(a,A{x := B}) = A{x := B}←−a = A←−a [x := B←−a ] =
A←−a [x := I1(a,B)] = A
←−−−−−−−−
a[I(a,B)/x] = I1(a[I(a,B)/x], A) .
That I2(a,A{x := B}) = I2(a[I(a,B)/x], A) if B is free for x in A follows by a
straightforward induction on the complexity of A which we leave to the reader.
Thus I(a,A{x := B}) = I(a[I(a,B)/x], A) if B is free for x in A.
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It remains to be shown that I(a,A) ∈ Dα for any assignment a and term A of
type α. This is done by induction on the complexity of A. That I(a, xα) ∈ Dα if
x is a variable follows from the fact that I(a, x) = a(x) and that I(a, cα) ∈ Dα
if α is basic is immediate. In the remaining cases the type of A is complex
and it suffices to prove that whenever α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉, 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , and
〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn :
(a) If L : A←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,A);
(b) If R : A←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ then 〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 /∈ I
2(a,A).
We shall consider each case. IH will be short for ‘induction hypothesis’.
• Aα ≡ c and α = 〈α1 . . . αn〉. The requirement follows from the definition
of I2(a, c) and clause 1. of definition 11.
• Aα ≡ ⊥ and α = 〈〉. The (a) part of the property follows from clause 2.
of definition 11, the (b) part from the fact that I2(a,⊥) = 0 = ∅.
• A ≡ B〈βα1...αn〉Cβ . Suppose 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , 〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn , then
L : (BC)←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
L : B←−a C←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ (IH)
〈I(a, C), 〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,B) ⇐⇒ (def. of I)
〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,BC)
This proves the (a) part of the case; the (b) part is similar.
• A ≡ (λxα1C〈α2...αn〉). Again suppose d1 = 〈B1, e1〉 ∈ Dα1 , . . . , dn =
〈Bn, en〉 ∈ Dαn , and reason as follows.
R : (λx.C)←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
R : λx.C←−a xB1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ Def. 11, B1 is closed
R : C←−a x{x := B1}B2 . . . Bn ∈ Γ ⇐⇒
R : C
←−−−−
a[d1/x]B2 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ (IH)
〈d2, . . . , dn〉 /∈ I
2(a[d1/x], C) ⇐⇒ (def. of I)
〈d1, d2, . . . , dn〉 /∈ I
2(a, λx.C)
This proves the (b) part, which is similar to the (a) part.
• Aα ≡ B ⊂ C. Then α = 〈〉 and B and C have some type 〈α1 . . . αn〉. Us-
ing induction we may assume that I(a,B), I(a, C) ∈ D〈α1...αn〉. Suppose
L : (B ⊂ C)←−a ∈ Γ, i.e. L : B←−a ⊂ C←−a ∈ Γ and reason as follows.
〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a,B) =⇒ (IH)
R : B←−a B1 . . . Bn /∈ Γ =⇒ (Def. 11)
L : C←−a B1 . . . Bn ∈ Γ =⇒ (IH)
〈〈B1, e1〉, . . . , 〈Bn, en〉〉 ∈ I
2(a, C)
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We conclude that I2(a,B) ⊆ I2(a, C) and that I2(a,B ⊂ C) = 1. This
proves the (a) part of the property. The (b) part is left to the reader.
This concludes the proof that I is an intension function for D and L. Now
define the function E by letting E(〈A, e〉) = e if 〈A, e〉 ∈ Dα for any complex
α. Clearly, E(I(a,A)) = I2(a,A) for any Aα, E is an extension function for
D, and M = 〈D, I,E〉 is an intensional model for the language L. It is easy to
see that M refutes Γ. We have already established that M is countable if Γ is
complete, and proposition 2 gives a normal intensional model refuting Γ which
is countable in case Γ is complete.
Before we continue with the proof of Model Existence, let us look at an applica-
tion. Hintikka’s Lemma sometimes gives an easy way of showing the refutability
of certain sequents. For example, while standard higher order logic validates the
sentence p = q∨q = r∨r = p (where p, q and r are type 〈〉 constants), a Hintikka
sequent (corresponding to an open tableau branch) shows that this is not the
case in ITL.
Proposition 5. ⇒ p = q, q = r, r = p is refutable by an intensional model.
Proof. The non-abbreviated form of ⇒ p = q, q = r, r = p is
Γ = {R : (λz.⊤) ⊂ (λz.zp ⊂ zq), R : (λz.⊤) ⊂ (λz.zq ⊂ zr),
R : (λz.⊤) ⊂ (λz.zr ⊂ zp)},
with z a variable of type 〈〈〉〉. An inspection tells that the following extension
Γ+ of Γ, in which c1, c2 and c3 are constants of type 〈〈〉〉, is a Hintikka sequent.
{R : (λz.⊤) ⊂ (λz.zp ⊂ zq), L : (λz.⊤)c1, R : (λz.zp ⊂ zq)c1, L : ⊤,
R : c1p ⊂ c1q, L : c1p, R : c1q, R : (λz.⊤) ⊂ (λz.zq ⊂ zr), L : (λz.⊤)c2,
R : (λz.zq ⊂ zr)c2, R : c2q ⊂ c2r, L : c2q, R : c2r,
R : (λz.⊤) ⊂ (λz.zr ⊂ zp), L : (λz.⊤)c3, R : (λz.zr ⊂ zp)c3, R : c3r ⊂ c3p,
L : c3r, R : c3p}
It follows that Γ+ and hence Γ are refutable by an intensional model.
This shows that it is consistent to assume that there are at least three proposi-
tions. It is clear that the method can be generalized to show that it is consistent
to assume a set of propositions ≥ any given countable cardinality. If the count-
ability restriction on languages is dropped, the existence of intensional models
with type 〈〉 domains ≥ any given cardinality is obtained. We leave it to the
reader to show that p ↔ q ⇒ p = q and other instances of Extensionality are
refutable.
Let us return to the main line of argument. In order to state the model
existence theorem below, we need the notion of a provability property (closely
related to Smullyan’s [27] abstract consistency property).
Definition 12. Let P be a set of sequents in the language L. P is a prov-
ability property in L if P is closed under sequent rules, i.e. if Γ ∈ P whenever
{Γ1, . . . ,Γn} ⊆ P and Γ1, . . . ,Γn/Γ is a sequent rule.
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A provability property P in L is sound if no Γ ∈ P is refuted by an inten-
sional model for L.
We now come to Model Existence itself: sequents that are not elements of
a sound provability property (in an extended language) can be extended to
Hintikka sequents (in that language) and are hence refutable.
Theorem 6 (Model Existence). Let L and C be languages such that L∩C = ∅
and each Cα is denumerably infinite. Assume that P is a sound provability
property in L∪ C and that Γ is a sequent in the language L. If Γ /∈ P then Γ is
refuted by a countable normal intensional model.
Proof. Let P and Γ be as described. We construct a Hintikka sequent Γ∗ such
that Γ ⊆ Γ∗. Let ϑ1, . . . , ϑn, . . . be an enumeration of all signed sentences
in L ∪ C. Write ι(ϑ) for the index that the signed sentence ϑ obtains in this
enumeration. Let Γ0 = Γ and define each Γn+1 by distinguishing the following
cases.
• Γn+1 = Γn, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} ∈ P ;
• Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϑn}, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} /∈ P and ϑn is not of the form R : A ⊂ B;
• Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϑn, L : Ac1 . . . cn,R : Bc1 . . . cn}, if Γn ∪ {ϑn} /∈ P and ϑn =
R : A ⊂ B for A and B of type 〈α1 . . . αn〉, where each ci is the first
constant in Cαi which does not occur in Γn ∪ {ϑn} and is no element of
{c1, . . . , ci−1}
This is well-defined since each Γn contains only a finite number of constants
from C. That Γn /∈ P for each n follows by a simple induction which uses
the definition of a provability property and the fact that [⊂R] is a sequent
rule. Define Γ∗ =
⋃
n Γn. For all finite sets {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} and for all k ≥
max{k1, . . . , kn}
{ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ
∗ ⇔ Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} /∈ P (5)
In order to show this, let k ≥ max{k1, . . . , kn} and let {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ
∗.
Then there is some ℓ such that {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γℓ. Let m = max{k, ℓ}. We
have that Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γm. Since Γm /∈ P and P is closed under
supersets (rule [W ]), it follows that Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} /∈ P . For the reverse
direction, suppose that Γk ∪ {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} /∈ P . Then, since P is closed under
supersets, Γki ∪ {ϑki} /∈ P , for each of the ki. By the construction of Γ
∗ each
ϑki ∈ Γ
∗ and {ϑk1 , . . . , ϑkn} ⊆ Γ
∗.
With the help of (5) it can be verified that Γ∗ is a Hintikka sequent. The
last condition of Definition 11 immediately follows from the construction of
Γ∗. We check condition 5, which may serve as an example for the other cases.
Assume L : A ⊂ B ∈ Γ∗ and let k be the maximum of ι(L : A ⊂ B), ι(L : B ~C),
and ι(R : A~C). Since, by (5), Γk ∪ {L : A ⊂ B} /∈ P and since P is closed
under sequent rules, it must be the case that either Γk ∪ {L : B ~C} /∈ P or
Γk ∪ {R : A~C} /∈ P , Using (5), we find that L : B ~C ∈ Γ
∗ or R : A~C ∈ Γ∗.
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We conclude that Γ∗ is refuted by an intensional modelM . In order to prove
that there is a normal countable intensional model that refutes Γ∗ and hence
Γ it suffices to show that Γ∗ is complete. Let ϕ be any sentence of L ∪ C and
assume that L : ϕ /∈ Γ∗ and R : ϕ /∈ Γ∗. Then, by (5), Γk ∪ {L : ϕ} ∈ P and
Γk ∪ {R : ϕ} ∈ P , for sufficiently large k. But M refutes Γk and therefore must
either refute Γk∪{L : ϕ} or Γk∪{R : ϕ}, contradicting the soundness of P . Thus
Γ∗ is complete and some normal countable intensional model refutes Γ∗ and Γ.
From model existence we can derive some nice corollaries. In the following Γ
will always be a sequent in some language L while ∆ ranges over sequents in
L ∪ C, where L and C are as in the formulation of Theorem 6.
Corollary 7 (Generalized Compactness). If Γ is i-valid then some finite
Γ0 ⊆ Γ is i-valid.
Proof. {∆ | some finite ∆0 ⊆ ∆ is i-valid} is a sound provability property.
Corollary 8 (Generalized Lo¨wenheim–Skolem). If Γ is not i-valid then Γ
is refutable by a countable normal intensional model.
Proof. {∆ | ∆ is i-valid} is a sound provability property.
Corollary 9 (Generalized Completeness). If Γ is i-valid then Γ is provable.
Hence Π |=i Σ =⇒ Π ⊢ Σ.
Proof. {∆ | ∆ is provable} is a sound provability property.
Corollary 10 (Cut elimination). If Π, ϕ ⊢ Σ and Π ⊢ Σ, ϕ then Π ⊢ Σ.
Proof. Use soundness and completeness.
7 A Linguistic Application
We now turn to a linguistic application of ITL and will develop the semantics
of a tiny fragment of English containing verbs of propositional attitude. It will
be shown that, given the present logic, it is consistent for an agent a to know
that ϕ without knowing that ψ, even if ϕ and ψ are co-entailing.
Before considering our special application, however, let us address the gen-
eral point of axiomatic extensions of the base logic. In most applications one
will like to work with a subclass of the class of intensional models that conform
to some set of non-logical axioms S. In that case one can define Π |=S Σ to
be S ∪ Π |=i Σ, while Π ⊢S Σ can be defined as S ∪ Π ⊢ Σ. Soundness and
generalized completeness immediately give that Π |=S Σ ⇐⇒ Π ⊢S Σ. Not all
applications will instantiate S in the same way, but one set of axioms that im-
mediately come to mind, and that we shall adopt here, are the usual principles
of λ-conversion. We may add these by assuming that S contains all universal
closures of instantiations of the following schemes.
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word translation word translation
if λp〈〉λq〈〉.p→ q man man〈e〉
no λP ′〈e〉λP〈e〉.¬∃xe(P
′x ∧ Px) unicorn unicorn〈e〉
some λP ′〈e〉λP〈e〉.∃xe(P
′x ∧ Px) runs run〈e〉
every λP ′〈e〉λP〈e〉.∀xe(P
′x→ Px) laughs laugh〈e〉
loves λQ〈〈e〉〉λxe.Q(λye.love〈ee〉 xy) Bill bill〈〈e〉〉
is λQ〈〈e〉〉λxe.Q(λye.x = y) Ann ann〈〈e〉〉
knows λp〈〉λxe.know〈e〈〉〉 xp Tully tully〈〈e〉〉
believes λp〈〉λxe.believe〈e〈〉〉 xp Cicero cicero〈〈e〉〉
Table 3: Some words and their translations
(α) λx.A = λy.A{x := y}, if y is free for x in A;
(β) (λx.A)B = A{x := B}, if B is free for x in A;
(η) λx.Ax = A, if x is not free in A.
As soon as these schemes are added to the base logic, the result is full intensional
identity of βη equivalent terms, i.e. |=S A = B will hold if A =βη B.
For our linguistic application we will proceed along lines pioneered by Mon-
tague [16] and define a small fragment of English. The words of this fragment
are given in Table 3, along with their translations into type logic. In these
translations the terms love, run, man, etc. are constants of the types indicated,
where e is the type of entities. The set of syntactic structures is obtained by
stipulating that all words in Table 3 are syntactic structures and that [XY ] is
a syntactic structure whenever X and Y are syntactic structures. Defining syn-
tactic structures in this way leads to a lot of gibberish along with the structures
we are interested in, but this is not important for present purposes. As long as
the desired structures are there and get reasonable interpretations our aim is
served.
Let us define the relation  (“translates as”) between syntactic structures
and terms as the smallest relation such that 1) X  A if X is a word and A is
its translation in Table 3 and 2) if X  A and Y  B then [XY ] AB if AB
is a well-formed term and [XY ]  BA if BA is well-formed. This leaves open
the possibility that a syntactic structure does not get a translation and indeed
many do not. Structures X for which there is no A such that X  A are called
uninterpretable and we have no interest in them.
Let us turn to some syntactic structures that are interpretable. In (1) be-
low two are given, together with (the β normal forms of) their interpretations.
Clearly, (1b), the interpretation of (1a), i-entails and is i-entailed by (1d), which
is the interpretation of (1c).
(1) a. [[[no man]laughs][if[[some unicorn]runs]]]
b. ∃x(unicorn x ∧ run x)→ ¬∃x(man x ∧ laugh x)
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c. [[[no unicorn]runs][if[[some man]laughs]]]
d. ∃x(man x ∧ laugh x)→ ¬∃x(unicorn x ∧ run x)
This does not mean however that (1b) and (1d) are identical in all intensional
models, as nothing excludes the possibility that I(a, (1b)) 6= I(a, (1d)) for some
intension function I. It follows that the two structures in (2) are not co-entailing.
(2) a. [[every man][knows[[[no man]laughs][if[[some unicorn]runs]]]]]
b. ∀y(man y → know y (∃x(unicorn x∧ run x)→ ¬∃x(man x∧ laugh x)))
c. [[every man][knows[[[no unicorn]runs][if[[some man]laughs]]]]]
d. ∀y(man y → know y (∃x(man x∧ laugh x)→ ¬∃x(unicorn x∧ run x)))
Suppose that c is some constant of type e. Then know c (1b) ⇒ know c (1d)
is in fact a Hintikka sequent and is therefore refuted by an intensional model
(addition of (α), (β) and (η) does not change this). This intensional model can
also be used to show that (2b) does not entail (2d). This is as desired, for even if
(2a) holds there may well be a man who has not managed to draw the inference
necessary to arrive at (1c). We have thus shown that the logic avoids the problem
of logical omniscience in the sense that it does not exclude the possibility that
a person knows one thing but fails to know another thing logically equivalent
with it. Essential use was made of the failure of Extensionality in our logic
ITL: terms of complex type can have the same extensions, even in all intensional
models, without necessarily having the same intension.
This distinction between extension and intension does not extend to terms of
basic type however and this raises the question how names are to be dealt with.
If they are treated straightforwardly using constants of type e (e.g. be, or in the
present context preferably λP.Pb, for ‘Bill’) we run into the standard problems
of the ‘Cicero–Tully’ or ‘Hesperus–Phosphorus’ kind. However, there are many
reasonable translations that do not directly equate names with type e constants.
The translations in Table 3, that send names to constants of the quantifier type
〈〈e〉〉, may serve as an example, provided some meaning postulates (additions
to S) like the following are adopted.
(3) a. ∀P (annP ↔ Pa)
b. ∀P (billP ↔ Pb)
c. ∀P (tullyP ↔ Pt)
d. ∀P (ciceroP ↔ Pc)
The structure [Tully runs] translates as tully run, but given the meaning pos-
tulates just introduced, this is equivalent with run t. Similarly, [Cicero runs]
translates as cicero run, equivalent with run c. And since [Tully[is Cicero]]
is translated as tully(λx.cicero(λy.x = y)), which is equivalent with t = c, it
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is readily explained why the argument Tully runs, Tully is Cicero, therefore
Cicero runs holds. But this reasoning essentially depends on extensional equiv-
alence and therefore will not go through once propositional attitudes enter the
picture. Consider the structure [Ann[believes[Tully runs]]]. It translates as
ann(λx.believe x(tully run)) and this is equivalent with believe a (tully run),
while believe a (cicero run) is equivalent with the translation of [Ann[believes
[Cicero runs]]]. However, there is no co-entailment between these sentences, even
in the presence of the postulates in (3) and the translation of [Tully[is Cicero]].
This shows that even for names the sense/reference distinction can be cap-
tured in this logic, provided one is willing to treat names with the help of
predicates (Quine’s ‘primacy of predicates’ comes to mind). Treating them as
being of type 〈〈e〉〉, as we have done here, is one possible strategy. There may
be others.
The present application of our intensional type theory to linguistic semantics
has avoided the concept of possible worlds altogether, as it was not needed in or-
der to illustrate our points. However, as possible worlds are obviously extremely
useful for the analysis of a range of natural language constructions (though not
for the true intensionality we have been concerned with in this paper), one might
well want to combine them with the present approach. Muskens [19, chapter 4]
gives a translation of what is essentially the fragment of Montague [16] into a
two-sorted relational type theory, with possible worlds providing an additional
basic type. Although the type theory in [19] validates Extensionality, its lan-
guage essentially is the language employed here, so that the translation can also
serve as a translation into ITL. A minor variation will treat names as they are
treated above.
8 Worlds
ITL is a generalization of the usual formulation of type theory and intensionality
is obtained by giving up the axiom of Extensionality, not by the introduction of
possible worlds, as in modal logic. However, while the usual Kripke-style seman-
tics is not known to do a very good job regarding the puzzles of intensionality
we have been concerned with here, it does perform very well when it comes to
modal reasoning, temporal reasoning, counterfactual reasoning etc. So it seems
that worlds and the possibility to quantify over worlds are still welcome, even
to those who accept the claim that the present approach to intensionality is
superior to the modal one.
If such a combination of modality with true intensionality is desired, one way
to proceed would be to simply add domains of worlds to the existing intensional
models and interpret a modal higher order language on the results, a course
of action followed in Muskens [21]. There is, however, an easier way. Once
true intensionality is obtained in the way it was done in this paper, worlds
can also be constructed out of propositions, the inhabitants of the domain D〈〉,
while accessibility relations can be obtained as well. The procedure will only
be sketched in this section; more formal considerations and comparisons with
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standard approaches to modality will be left to a future occasion.
The idea of constructing possible worlds out of other entities is an old one.
E.g. Wittgenstein [33] constructs them out of ‘states of affairs’ and Carnap [4]
takes worlds to be ‘state-descriptions’, maximal consistent sets of sentences. A
recent construction of worlds from propositions can be found in Pollard [23].
Varying upon such proposals, one can identify worlds with certain objects of
type 〈〈〉〉 here, i.e. objects whose extensions are sets of propositions. Here is the
construction. Assume, for simplicity, the principles (α), (β), and (η) discussed
above, and let Ω, which will stand for the predicate ‘is a world’, be a fixed
constant of type 〈〈〈〉〉〉, while w varies over objects of type 〈〈〉〉. Stipulate the
following.
(W1) ∀w(Ωw → ¬w⊥)
(W2) ∀w(Ωw → (w(A ⊂ B)↔ ∀~x(w(A~x)→ w(B~x))))
The first of these axioms requires world extensions to be consistent while addi-
tion of the second schema makes worlds distribute over logical operators. State-
ments such as the following become derivable.
a. ∀w(Ωw → (w(¬ϕ)↔ ¬(wϕ)))
b. ∀w(Ωw → (w(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ((wϕ) ∧ (wψ))))
c. ∀w(Ωw → (w(∀xϕ) ↔ ∀x(wϕ)))
d. ∀w(Ωw → (w(∃xϕ) ↔ ∃x(wϕ)))
The first of these statements says that worlds are complete, while the last two are
‘Henkin properties’ that enforce, for example, that if an existential proposition
is an element of the extension of a given world some proposition witnessing the
existential must also be an element. In general, given (W1) and (W2), worlds
single out sets of propositions that could be simultaneously true.
It is natural from this perspective to introduce a constant w0 of type 〈〈〉〉 that
is meant to denote the actual world, the world consisting of all propositions that
are true (in a given intensional model). If this is wanted one should stipulate
the following.
a. Ωw0
b. ∀p〈〉(w0p↔ p).
The first of these requirements merely stipulates that w0 is a world while the
second makes it the actual world. In models additionally satisfying Exten-
sionality, w0 is the only world in view of the fact that there are exactly two
propositions in such models, but in other intensional models there is no such
trivialization. Note, by the way, that nothing requires co-extensional worlds
to be identical. The set of propositions that are true in some world does not
necessarily determine it.
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Since worlds are of type 〈〈〉〉 it is possible to iterate and form propositions
w1ϕ, w2(w1ϕ), w3(w2(w1ϕ)) and so on. Is it acceptable that these differ in
truth value? Here we shall assume that this is not so and that if a proposition
wϕ is true at some world, it is true at all, provided w is a world. The question
whether a proposition is in the extension of a world should arguably be world-
independent itself. The way to enforce this is by adopting the following axiom
scheme.
(W3) ∀ww′((Ωw ∧Ωw′)→ (w(w′ϕ)↔ (w′ϕ)))
In a similar vein, the question whether an 〈〈〉〉 object is a world, presumably
should also be uniform across worlds:
(W4) ∀w(Ωw → ∀w′(Ωw′ ↔ w(Ωw′)))
We now have worlds, but we still do not have accessibility relations between
worlds. These can be obtained, however, by considering more expressions of
type 〈〈〈〉〉〉. If R is such an expression, it can be interpreted as the predicate
‘is accessible’, and λwλw′.w(Rw′) will play the role of an accessibility relation.
The usual relational properties (transitivity, reflexivity, euclideanness,. . . ) can
then either be stipulated or, depending on the choice of R, be shown to hold.
For example, the universal accessibility relation λwλw′.w(Ωw′) is easily seen to
be an equivalence relation on the set of worlds in view of (W4).
A next step is the introduction of the usual modal operators. Modal boxes
can be obtained by writing [R] for λp∀w((Ωw ∧ Rw) → wp), so that [R]ϕ
will reduce to ∀w((Ωw ∧ Rw) → wϕ). Diamonds are obtained as usual, as
the duals of boxes: 〈R〉 is short for λp.¬[R]¬p. Note that if w′ can be shown
to be a world, the statement w′([R]ϕ), i.e. w′(∀w((Ωw ∧ Rw) → wϕ)), will be
equivalent with ∀w((w′(Ωw)∧w′(Rw))→ w′(wϕ)) by the distribution of worlds
over logical operators and the last statement will in its turn be equivalent with
∀w((Ωw ∧ w′(Rw))→ wϕ) by (W3) and (W4).
Let us give another example of an accessibility relation some of whose prop-
erties follow from its definition. The relation of belief considered in the previous
section, λpλx.believe xp, is one of explicit belief. It is not closed under entail-
ment or even under logical equivalence. But there is also a notion of implicit
belief that is closed under entailment. Roughly, one implicitly believes ϕ if one
rationally should believe ϕ given one’s explicit beliefs. One way to model this
(for some arbitrary agent john) is to consider the following property R of worlds.
λw.∀p((believe john p↔ w(believe john p)) ∧ (believe john p→ wp))
Here a world w is accessible if John’s explicit beliefs in w are exactly those that
John actually holds and if those explicit beliefs are in fact true in w. There
may fail to be such worlds, for example if John’s explicit beliefs are in fact
inconsistent, a situation not ruled out by our previous considerations. But it is
possible to stipulate that λwλw′.w(Rw′) is in fact serial:
∀w∃w′∀p((w(believe john p)↔ w′(believe john p)) ∧ (w(believe john p)→ w′p))
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Such a stipulation is simultaneously an existence requirement on worlds and a
rationality constraint on John’s beliefs. It will lead to the derivability of the
usualD axiom, as [R]ϕ→ 〈R〉ϕ will now hold for all ϕ. Note that the definition
of R immediately gives transitivity and euclideanity of λwλw′.w(Rw′), so that
we have, for all ϕ, that [R]ϕ→ [R][R]ϕ and 〈R〉ϕ→ [R]〈R〉ϕ. These correspond
to the usual 4 and 5 axioms.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced an abstract and simple notion of intensional
model that is a generalization of Henkin’s general models. Its definition does not
involve concepts that have no immediate intuitive justification, such as the “ab-
straction designation functions” of Fitting [10] or the “application operators”
of Benzmu¨ller et al. [3]. These operators provide generalized, non-standard no-
tions of abstraction in one case and of application in the other, but seem to
have no justification other than a purely technical one. The present approach,
in contrast, gives a kind of minimal logic of intension and extension, with in-
gredients that well-nigh any logic of intension and extension seems to need.
Models are inhabited by intensions, a function I sends terms to their intensions
and functions Eα send intensions to the extensions they determine. If an ad-
ditional requirement should be made that the Eα be injective, one essentially
obtains Henkin’s general models, if, moreover, the E〈α1...αn〉 should be required
to be onto P(Dα1 × · · · ×Dαn), standard models are obtained.
The logic contrasts with other approaches to (hyper-)intensionality in two
ways. Firstly, unlike other approaches, the aim is not to set up a new logic,
but to provide existing classical type theory with a wider class of models in
order to invalidate the axiom of Extensionality, which is unwanted in many
applications. Secondly, the logic is agnostic about what intensions are. To the
latter question various answers have been given but here we have only provided
an abstract characterization of the notion of intensionality. We have, in other
words, focused on the logic rather than on the ontology of intensions.
While the logic is a generalisation of classical type theory, not an extension
with new concepts, it turns out that there is a natural connection with the usual
notion of modality. Intensional models may have domains of the propositional
type 〈〉 that are not isomorphic with {0, 1} and certain properties of objects
in these domains can be identified with possible worlds. Accessibility relations
of various kinds between such worlds are easily definable and modal box and
diamond operators can be obtained accordingly.
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